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Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions 
 
By Dennis Leech (University of Warwick) and Robert Leech (Birkbeck, 
University of London) 
 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
 
July 1 marks the 60th anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference that set up 
the IMF and World Bank as the foundation stones of a new international 
economic order in the aftermath of the second world war. Today, not only 
have their roles changed substantially, but the scale and scope of their 
activities have extended far beyond what was then planned.  
 
Yet their systems of governance have remained basically unchanged. And as 
more and more countries participate in their programmes, mainly poor and 
developing countries that have had to meet their tough economic and political 
conditions, there is increasing pressure for change. Developing countries are 
demanding a voice in the way the Bretton Woods institutions are run. 
 
This paper studies the system of weighted voting that has always been at the 
heart of decision making in the IMF and World Bank. We argue, first, that 
weighed voting creates a bias that favours the USA, as the member with the 
largest voting power, at the expense of all other member countries. The 
system gives different countries different numbers of votes according to their 
quota (in the IMF) or shareholding (in the World Bank). Thus in the IMF the 
USA has 17.1% of the votes, followed by Japan with 6.1, Germany 6.0, UK 
and France 4.9 each, and so on down the scale; China has 2.9%, India 1.9, 
Brazil 1.4. But we show that the USA has much more voting power than even 
this very unequal allocation of weighted votes would suggest. 
 
There are many glaring anomalies in the allocation of voting weights that often 
do not reflect a country’s importance in the world economy or population – for 
example China has the same IMF votes as Canada, and South Korea fewer 
than Denmark. But such are not the main concern of the paper; how the 
voting allocation disadvantages the poor is discussed in A. Buira (editor) 
Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives. 
 
Voting Power: Bias towards the USA 
 
We argue that each country’s real voting power lies not just in the number of 
votes it has but in its ability to use them to determine decisions taken by 
voting. We can study this question using Voting Power Analysis (a branch of 
the mathematical theory of games) to do this evaluation on a computer. Our 
analysis finds that (in the IMF) the USA with 17.1 % of the votes has at least 
20.4% of the power, and all other members slightly less power than their 
voting weight. In the World Bank our finding is that the 16.4% of the votes cast 
by the USA give it at least 19.5% of the voting power. 
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Thus there is a hidden bias that is built into the constitution through the use of 
weighted voting. [Of course the power of the USA is actually much greater 
than this in practice because of the tendency of smaller countries to follow its 
lead; but our analysis excludes that.] We show that there is still a distortion 
that comes just from the rules – a finding of some significance that 
undermines the arguments of those who seek to present the IMF and World 
Bank as models of good governance.  
 
These results are for the Board of Governors, the supreme governing body 
where each country is directly represented. We also analysed the Executive 
Board, which runs the organisation from day to day, which also uses weighted 
voting with the same weights. 
 
Both the IMF and World Bank have executive boards with 24 directors, some 
of whom are appointed by their countries but most are elected by groups of 
countries arranged in so-called constituencies. Each director wields the total 
number of votes of his or her country or constituency. We find that this leads 
to the same finding: the weighted voting system adds to the power of the 
USA’s director, even above what it is theoretically intended to be and all other 
directors lose out. With 17.1% of the voting weight the USA has 21.5% of the 
voting power in the IMF executive, and in the World Bank with 16.4% of the 
votes it has 20.2% of the voting power on the executive. 
 
Constituency Accountability of Executive Directors 
 
Defenders of the status quo claim the election of directors by constituencies 
as evidence of democratic accountability. We investigate this and find that the 
structure of the constituency system actually works to substantially strengthen 
the voting power of a few countries, mainly rich European ones especially 
Belgium and the Netherlands. It also means that some countries almost 
always have directors because they dominate their constituencies; these are 
Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Brazil and India; also Belgium, Netherlands, 
Australia and Argentina are effectively dominant. Their directors are very 
powerful because their weighted votes on the executive board are swollen by 
those of the other constituency members; Belgium and Netherlands cast more 
weighed votes in the executive than UK or France. 
 
We find that the system disfranchises 41 countries that are found to have no 
voting power in their constituencies. In most cases this is because they 
belong to a constituency with a member who has a majority of the votes but 
there are also some surprising cases. 
 
Unexpected Results: Estonia and Central American Republics are 
Powerless 
 
The study demonstrates the value of voting power analysis in revealing some 
unexpected results that can occur in a weighted voting system. We find that 
some countries are disfranchised in their constituency even though there is no 
majority member.  
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Thus in the Nordic/Baltic constituency (comprising all the Scandinavian and 
Baltic states), Estonia is disfranchised in the IMF – its 920 votes counting for 
nothing - although its 1,173 votes in the World Bank are influential. 
 
A second example occurs in the Spanish/ Venezuelan/ Mexican constituency 
where it is found that these three countries share all the voting power between 
them and the remaining five members (Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala) are all disfranchised. These results – which are 
quite unambiguous, arising as they do from the arithmetic of the voting system 
- can only be discovered by the application of the voting power approach to 
analyse weighted voting systems. 
 
US Veto 
 
It is well known that in both the IMF and World Bank the USA has a veto over 
certain key decisions because they require a special majority of 85% of the 
votes which can only be achieved with the votes of the USA. The analysis of 
this paper has excluded consideration of this special majority and considered 
only ordinary decisions requiring a simple 50% majority of the votes, for 
reasons explained in the paper. The power implications of special majorities 
have been dealt with in a previous paper. 
 
 1 
Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Weighed voting is fundamental to the workings of the IMF and World Bank. 
The principle that all member countries have the right to vote but cast different 
numbers of votes to reflect key differences between them was enshrined in the 
original Bretton Woods constitutions and has dominated their work ever since. This 
has been shown to have resulted in practice in a severe democratic imbalance with a 
voting structure that is massively biased against the developing and poor countries. 
Many of the current calls for reform propose changes to the weights in order to 
increase the voice of the poor in decisions that affect their interests. Such proposals 
for reform are not the central concern of this paper and we will avoid discussing them 
in as much detail as they deserve, leaving it to others who have done so more ably and 
persuasively. 
Instead, this paper will argue that a further bias exists, which results from the 
weighted voting system itself. It is possible to correct for this bias also by suitable 
choice of weights. However, in order to so we must understand the characteristics of 
weighted voting systems in terms of their implications for voting power that derive, 
not directly from the weights, but from the system as a whole. It is first necessary to 
establish that a member country’s voting power is not the same as its weight: its 
power is its ability to decide the issue when a vote is taken whereas its weight is just 
the number of votes it has the right to cast; the former is a fundamental property of the 
voting system and the weights, that can only be revealed by suitable analysis, whereas 
the latter is a superficial feature. Because this distinction is often ignored, weighted 
voting often leads to undesired or unexpected properties. We analyse members’ 
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voting power and find that the BWIs are even more undemocratic than they are 
intended to be because the USA turns out to have much more voting power than its 
weight at the expense of the other members. This is another argument for reforming 
the weights. More generally the distinction between power and weight adds to the 
case for decoupling the allocation of votes from both the provision of and access to 
finance. 
It is frequently suggested that the current system of weighted voting embodies 
democratic accountability if one accepts the principle that voting rights should be 
attached to the supply of capital in the form of quotas1, since it guarantees that voting 
power is allocated according to members’ respective financial contributions. This 
argument has more force today than it has had in the past with the decline in the so-
called ‘basic votes’ and increase in the variable component of voting weight to virtual 
dominance2. In fact the distorting effect of weighted voting that we describe here 
makes this claim far from being true, even in its own terms. 
As a general principle weighted voting is an attractive idea because it offers the 
prospect of designing an intergovernmental decision-making body that could have a 
real claim to democratic legitimacy – for example in an institution of world 
government where a country’s voting power reflects its population. But it is important 
to be clear about what we mean by weighted voting. Systems based on the use of a 
bloc vote where a country or group of countries acting together casts all its voting 
                                                
1 For example, “I would also like to underline that still we are a financial institution, 
and a financial institution means you need also to have someone who provides capital, 
and I think there is a healthy element in the fact that the provision of capital and 
voting rights is, in a way, combined, because this is also an element of efficiency, of 
accountability.” Horst Köhler, Managing Director of the IMF, in evidence to the 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 4th July 2002. 
2 See Buira (2002), Van Houtven (2002). 
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weight as a single unit, as in the Bretton Woods Institutions, cannot be relied on to 
work like that and in general do not, as we will show. On the other hand if the system 
is one where a country is represented by a number of delegates each of whom has one 
vote that they are allowed to cast individually, rather than having to cast their votes as 
a unit, then there is no problem. The latter is simply a representative democracy and 
the number of votes or delegates is equivalent to the country’s power. The argument 
we are advancing here holds only in the former case, when the votes cannot be split. 
We will use the method of voting power analysis to explore the relationships 
between the voting weights, the decision rule and the resulting voting powers of the 
members. This requires us to analyse all the voting outcomes that can occur, and in 
each case to investigate the ability of every member to be decisive – that is to be able 
to decide whether the vote leads to a decision or not. An important aspect will be use 
of voting power indices to make comparisons between the powers of the different 
members. Our principal result is that the voting power of the USA turns out to be far 
greater than its quota would warrant. We also use the method to investigate two 
important hypothetical scenarios. First, the power implications of a redistribution of 
voting rights that is being seriously proposed and enjoys widespread support, the 
restoration of the basic votes to their original 1946 level. The second scenario we 
consider is the Executive Board as a representative body in which the constituencies 
are really taken seriously as such. The main result here is that this system 
considerably enhances the power of the smaller European countries, especially 
Belgium and Netherlands. 
We begin with an outline of the principles of voting power analysis in the next 
section. Then in section 3 the system of governance of the IMF and World Bank is 
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outlined, in section 4 we present the analysis of the Board of Governors, and in 
section 5 that of the Executive Board. In subsequent sections we use voting power 
analysis to study the effects of structural changes that have been proposed: 
reweighting by restoring the basic votes to their original 1946 level of 11.3 percent of 
the votes, in section 6, and in section 7 we consider the voting power implications for 
making the constituency system of the Executive Board democratic by introducing 
formal voting within constituencies. 
 
2. Weighted Voting and Voting Power Analysis 
It is customary, in the language of the Bretton Woods Institutions, to refer to the 
number of votes a member country has as its ‘voting power’. No doubt this is what its 
voting power is intended to be, but it is certainly not its power in the true sense of the 
term, but its weight, in the sense of weighted voting. A country’s power is its capacity 
to be decisive in a decision taken by vote, measured by the frequency with which it 
can change a losing vote to a winning one. In general this has a rather imprecise 
relation with its weight. In reality its power depends on all the other members’ 
weights as well as the voting rule by which decisions are taken. 
An important real-world example makes the point clearly and is worth 
considering here, even though it does not come from the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Between 1958 and 1972 the European Economic Community comprised six 
countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. 
Although most decisions then were taken by unanimity, some were taken by qualified 
majority voting; that is a form of weighted voting,, wherein France, Italy and West 
Germany had four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two, and Luxembourg 
one. Thus it was said that Belgium possessed half - and Luxembourg one quarter - as 
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much voting power as West Germany, although their relative populations were only 
16.7 percent and 0.6 percent respectively of that of West Germany. It was often said 
that the smaller countries were overrepresented in the voting system relative to their 
population sizes but that this was not a problem because they were sovereign states 
and voting power should reflect that as well as population sizes. But this was false as 
voting power analysis reveals. 
Considering all possible voting outcomes shows that Luxembourg had no 
voting power whatever. The threshold number of votes for a decision to be taken by 
qualified majority voting had been fixed at 12. This decision rule meant that 
Luxembourg could only be decisive if the combined total of the votes cast by the 
other five members came to 11, which was impossible since they were all even 
numbers. Therefore the voting power of Luxembourg in any vote under qualified 
voting was precisely zero. We therefore have the significant finding that one of the six 
sovereign states that made up the EEC was in fact powerless3 in qualified majority 
voting; this result should be more widely known than it is. It is important also because 
it illustrates the usefulness of voting power analysis in a real example and moreover 
the results do not depend on use of models or assumptions which might be open to 
question but are simple arithmetical facts.4 
By contrast, the same analysis shows that Belgium had some voting power. This 
can be measured by means of a power index as follows. Considering all voting 
outcomes that could theoretically occur, Belgium (equivalently Netherlands) could be 
decisive in 6 cases, while West Germany (equivalently France or Italy) could be 
                                                
3 The reader should note that there is nothing in this finding other than simple 
arithmetic.  
4 See Leech (2003b) on the relevance of voting power analysis. 
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decisive in 10 cases out of the 32 possibilities. Then the power index of Belgium 
(Netherlands) is 6/32= 0.1875 and that of West Germany (France, Italy) 
10/32=0.3125. Then we can say that Belgium has sixty percent (that is, its relative 
decisiveness, equal to 6/10 = 0.1875/0.3125) of the power of West Germany. This 
result does support the idea that the weighted voting system did mean that Belgium 
was overrepresented in relation to its population, compared with West Germany. 
We use the voting power approach and power indices to study the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the next section. By considering all possible voting outcomes 
the method is technically that of a priori voting power: each member’s power index is 
its decisiveness as a fraction of the possible outcomes. The method can be thought of 
as an analysis of the implications for power of the rules of decision making, as giving 
what can be called constitutional power5. Probability calculus is used as a tool for 
calculating the power indices6.  
The methodology of voting power analysis will be used in two ways in this 
study. First it will be used to analyse power relations in the existing structures of the 
IMF and World Bank. We will also consider the effects of restoring basic votes to 
their original level, aimed at increasing the power of poor countries. These will be the 
main empirical results of the paper.  
The methodology can also be used to study the properties of indirect procedures 
where there is first a vote in each of a series of groups each containing a number of 
                                                
5 No consideration is given here for the members’ preferences, which would 
determine the likelihood of particular members voting in the same way as each other, 
which would produce an analysis of empirical voting power. Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of the present study but would be useful in future work.  
6 Technically these are Penrose indices (equivalently known as absolute Banzhaf 
indices or Coleman power indices). See Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 
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members and then each of them votes as a bloc in the second stage. The power index 
described above provides a simple methodology for doing such analysis, since the 
power index for any member is simply obtained as the product of the two relevant 
power indices. This approach follows that proposed by Coleman (1973) to address the 
question of why social actors give up power to join groups. By joining with others in 
a group, an actor gives up his power as an independent voter but may gain by 
becoming a member of the group which is powerful because it possesses the power of 
combined forces. The use of power indices permits results to be obtained very easily 
since it allows us to combine the power of the actor within the group and the power of 
the group. This approach lends itself naturally to the analysis of intergovernmental 
weighted voting with accountability to a lower body, whether a country’s electorate or 
a regional intergovernmental grouping. It is also useful for the analysis of voting 
power implications of changes to the architecture of voting in the international 
institutions.  
The second use of voting power analysis in this paper, then, as an application of 
this approach, is more methodological in focus, and speculative in context. The 
intention is to illustrate the approach, which has not been widely used. We will 
analyse the Executive boards of the BWIs treating them formally as constituent, 
representative bodies based on the existing constituencies and weights. We emphasise 
that such scenarios are very stylized and open to criticism. 
 
3. Weighted Voting in the IMF and World Bank 
The IMF and World Bank have broadly similar constitutions, the main 
differences between them being relatively minor. All countries have direct 
representation at the highest level, as members of the Board of Governors, but the 
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management of each of the institutions is done by its respective Executive Board, 
whose members are either appointed or elected. The voting weight of each country is 
made up of two components: a fixed component of 250 ‘basic’ votes which is the 
same for each country, and a variable component that depends on the country’s quota 
(IMF) or shareholding (WB)7. When the BWIs were created, this arrangement was 
intended as a compromise between the equal representation of member countries (via 
the basic votes) and voting power based on contributions in the manner of a joint 
stock company. Over time the basic element has become eroded and the quota- or 
share-based votes have come to dominate. This is a major factor in the 
disempowerment of the poor countries and the restoration of the basic votes to their 
original level is a main aim of the reform movement. 
There are currently (in 2003) 184 members. The USA has by far the largest 
voting weight, with 371,743 votes, 17.11 percent, in the IMF (and 16.41 in the World 
Bank, IBRD). This is followed by Japan with 6.14 percent (7.87), Germany 6.00 
percent (4.49), France and UK with 4.95 percent (4.31) and so on. The smallest 
member is Palau with 281 votes, representing 0.01 percent (0.02). 
The Executive Board consists of 24 members some of whom are appointed by 
their governments and some of whom are elected by member states. Five directors are 
appointed by the members with the largest quotas or shareholdings: USA, Japan, 
Germany, France and Britain. Three other members are appointed by Saudi Arabia, 
China and Russia. The remaining 16 directors are elected by the members. Executive 
directors use weighted voting exactly like the governors, the appointed directors 
                                                
7 We take the IBRD votes and shareholdings to represent the World Bank, although it 
actually consists of four different bodies that have different voting weights. Studying 
the implications of these differences will be left for later work. 
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exercising the number of votes of the member that appointed them, and the elected 
directors casting the combined number of votes of the countries that voted for them. 
There are elections for directors every two years. The rules for electing directors lay 
down strict limits on the sizes of the weighted votes that they can control in order to 
prevent any elected director becoming too powerful. The result is a pattern of voting 
power generally similar to that of the governors. 
There are a variety of decision rules that are used for different types of 
decisions. Ordinary decisions are made by simple (weighted) majority of the votes 
cast (the quorum for meetings of the Board of Governors being a majority of 
members having not less than two-thirds of the voting weight; that for the Executive 
Board being a majority of directors having not less than one-half of the total voting 
weight). A number of matters require decisions to be taken by a supermajority of 85 
percent. This supermajority, taken in conjunction with the weight of the USA, 17.11 
percent in the IMF and 16.41 in the World Bank, mean that the USA is the only single 
member that possesses a veto.  
It is well known that the American veto has always been an important aspect of 
the governance of the institutions, and continues to be so, the articles having been 
amended to increase the supermajority threshold for special decisions from 80 to 85 
percent when the USA wanted to reduce its contribution. The existence of this veto 
power does not mean that the USA can be said to control the institutions, however. 
On the contrary, although it gives it absolute unilateral blocking power, at the same 
time it also limits that country’s power because it equally ensures a veto for small 
groups of other countries. Formally, in terms of Coleman’s terminology,8 while the 
                                                
8 Defined in Coleman (1971). 
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supermajority rule gives the United States complete power to prevent action, it also 
limits its power to initiate action. Therefore its power – and its power index (which is 
an average of these two) - is limited. The existence of the 85 percent supermajority 
can be seen to give a veto power to three other countries acting together (for example, 
Japan, Germany and France). The developing countries, if they acted as a bloc, or the 
EU countries, or many other similar small groups, obviously have a veto9. The 85 
percent rule effectively tends to equalize power to a considerable extent.10 For these 
reasons the power analysis in this study considers only ordinary decisions that require 
a simple majority vote. Analysis of power under supermajorities (for the IMF) has 
been made in Leech (2002a). 
 
4. Power in the Board of Governors 
Table 1 presents the results for the Boards of Governors of both the BWIs. The 
countries are arranged in order of their voting weight (and voting power) in the IMF. 
The table shows, for each of the main countries, in the respective columns, for the 
IMF, (1) its share of the total weighted votes, (2) its power index11, (3) its power 
index normalized such that it is expressed as a share of the total power; the 
equivalents for the World Bank are in columns (4), (5) and (6). The remaining three 
                                                
9 This point about the difference between veto power and the power of control was 
made very clearly by Keynes in opposition to the proposed American veto based on 
supermajorities in his maiden speech to the House of Lords in 1943 at the time when 
the Bretton Woods institutions were being planned. See Moggridge (1980), p. 278; 
also his Letter to J. Viner, p. 328. Keynes advocated simple majority voting. 
10 Taking the argument to its limit, the case of a unanimity rule (i.e. a supermajority 
requirement of 100 percent) would give every member a veto and equalise power, 
making voting weight irrelevant.  
11 These power indices have been calculated using the computer program ipmmle, 
which implements the algorithm for computing power indices for voting bodies which 
are large both in having many members and where the voting weights are large, 
described in Leech (2003a). For an overview of computing power indices see Leech 
(2002b). 
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columns contain the shares of world GDP in terms of nominal dollars and purchasing 
power parity, and finally shares of world population, for comparison. 
The table shows that the voting power of the United States is considerably more 
than its weight in both institutions. This result is a property of the weighted voting 
system with the given weights. All other members have less power than their weight. 
Thus we can say that the weighted voting system, as it is presently constituted, has a 
hidden tendency to enhance the power of the USA at the expense of all other 
countries. 
The table brings out some of the inconsistencies that exist in the allocation of 
voting weights as well as voting power in the BWIs. The USA has a much smaller 
share of voting weight than its share of world GDP, over 32 percent, would warrant; 
on the other hand it seems about right if its voting power is compared with its share of 
GDP in Purchasing Power Parity terms, and way too much compared with its 
population.  
It also brings out a number of glaring anomalies. Canada and China have the 
same number of votes, and voting power, but on each of the three criteria, China is 
much bigger than Canada. This bias against developing countries is seen also, 
particularly in the IMF, in the comparison of the voting weight of countries like 
Belgium, Netherlands and Spain with India, Brazil and Mexico. A particularly glaring 
juxtaposition is that between Denmark and South Korea in the IMF, the former 
having more voting weight than the latter. 
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Table 1. Voting Weights and Voting Powers in the Governors  
(Selected Countries) 
  
 IMF World Bank Shares of World: 
 Weight Power Power Weight Power Power  
 Share Index Share Share Index Share GDP GDP(PPP) Population 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
USA 17.11 0.7631 20.43 16.41 0.7471 19.49 32.90 21.88 4.71 
Japan 6.14 0.2243 6.00 7.87 0.3014 7.86 13.54 7.13 2.10 
Germany 6.00 0.2189 5.86 4.49 0.1669 4.35 6.04 4.66 1.36 
France 4.95 0.1794 4.80 4.31 0.1598 4.17 4.28 3.17 0.98 
UK 4.95 0.1794 4.80 4.31 0.1598 4.17 4.66 3.17 0.97 
Italy 3.26 0.1169 3.13 2.79 0.1026 2.68 3.56 3.19 0.96 
SaudiArabia 3.23 0.1157 3.10 2.79 0.1026 2.68 0.61 0.64 0.35 
Canada 2.94 0.1054 2.82 2.79 0.1026 2.68 2.27 1.88 0.51 
China 2.94 0.1054 2.82 2.79 0.1026 2.68 3.79 11.42 21.00 
Russia 2.75 0.0983 2.63 2.79 0.1026 2.68 1.01 2.30 2.39 
Netherlands 2.39 0.0853 2.28 2.21 0.0812 2.12 1.24 0.97 0.26 
Belgium 2.13 0.0761 2.04 1.81 0.0663 1.73 0.75 0.59 0.17 
India 1.93 0.0687 1.84 2.79 0.1026 2.68 1.56 6.55 17.05 
Switzerland 1.60 0.0572 1.53 1.66 0.0609 1.59 0.81 0.45 0.12 
Australia 1.50 0.0535 1.43 1.53 0.0561 1.46 1.21 1.10 0.32 
Spain 1.42 0.0504 1.35 1.75 0.0641 1.67 1.90 1.85 0.68 
Brazil 1.41 0.0502 1.34 2.07 0.0762 1.99 1.64 2.83 2.85 
Venezuela 1.24 0.044 1.18 1.27 0.0467 1.22 0.41 0.31 0.41 
Mexico 1.20 0.0428 1.15 1.18 0.0432 1.13 2.02 1.87 1.64 
Sweden 1.11 0.0397 1.06 0.94 0.0345 0.90 0.69 0.48 0.15 
Argentina 0.99 0.0351 0.94 1.12 0.0412 1.07 0.88 0.95 0.62 
Indonesia 0.97 0.0345 0.92 0.94 0.0345 0.90 0.48 1.37 3.45 
Austria 0.87 0.0311 0.83 0.70 0.0256 0.67 0.62 0.49 0.13 
South Africa 0.87 0.031 0.83 0.85 0.0311 0.81 0.37 1.09 0.71 
Nigeria 0.82 0.0292 0.78 0.80 0.0292 0.76 0.14 0.25 2.14 
Norway 0.78 0.0278 0.74 0.63 0.0232 0.60 0.54 0.30 0.07 
Denmark 0.77 0.0273 0.73 0.85 0.031 0.81 0.53 0.35 0.09 
Korea 0.76 0.0272 0.73 0.99 0.0364 0.95 1.38 1.60 0.78 
Iran 0.70 0.025 0.67 1.48 0.0543 1.42 0.37 0.87 1.07 
Malaysia 0.70 0.0248 0.66 0.53 0.0192 0.50 0.29 0.47 0.39 
… … … … … … … … … … 
Power indices calculations done using the program ipmmle available from the website 
www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae. 
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5. Power in the Executive Board 
Table 2 shows the equivalent analysis for the Executive Board.12 All twenty four 
countries whose representatives are directors are listed. In the main these are the same 
for both institutions but, where they differ, as in the case of some elected directors, 
both countries are named. The directors of the first five countries listed are appointed 
and the rest are elected. For the latter countries, the number of members in the 
constituencies that elect them are given in column (1); apart from the three one-
country constituencies which effectively appoint rather than elect, these vary from 4 
to 20 and 24. As before the table shows the voting weight, power index and power 
share for both BWIs.  
In so far as direct comparisons are meaningful, results are very similar to those 
for the Governors. Direct comparisons of power indices for the directly appointed 
directors are possible, but for some of the elected directors they are not so 
straightforward because it is necessary to take account of the power distribution 
within the constituency. We provide a fuller analysis of the Executive Board in 
section 7 below. 
The results show the same effect as before: a strong tendency for weighted 
voting to enhance the voting power of the United States at the expense of the other 
directors. 
                                                
12 It is customary for spokesmen for the BWIs to point out that decisions in the 
executive are normally taken by consensus and formal votes are avoided. However 
this claim has been questioned on the grounds that decision making during a debate 
involves informally keeping a tally of the weighted votes held by the executive 
directors who speak on each side according to the sense of their contribution, a 
‘consensus’ being deemed to have been found when the required majority has been 
reached. Thus although a formal vote is avoided, the system may be closer to 
weighted majority voting than consensus building. See Woods (2001). 
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Table 2. Voting Weights and Voting Powers in the Executive Directors 
   IMF World Bank 
 Country of  No. of  Voting Power Power Voting Power Power 
Seat Director* Members Weight Share Index Weight Share Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 USA   17.11 21.50 0.64586 16.41 20.18 0.62311 
2 Japan  6.14 5.83 0.17511 7.87 7.55 0.23323 
3 Germany  6.00 5.69 0.17105 4.49 4.27 0.13198 
4 France   4.95 4.70 0.14117 4.31 4.12 0.12716 
5 UK   4.95 4.70 0.14117 4.31 4.12 0.12716 
6 Belgium,  Austria 10 5.14 4.88 0.14651 4.80 4.60 0.14196 
7 Netherlands  12 4.85 4.60 0.13823 4.47 4.27 0.1319 
8 Spain,  Venezuela 8 4.28 4.06 0.12187 4.50 4.31 0.13294 
9 Italy  7 4.19 3.97 0.11922 3.51 3.35 0.10337 
10 Canada 12 3.71 3.52 0.10559 3.85 3.68 0.11351 
11 Iceland,  Denmark 8 3.51 3.33 0.09988 3.34 3.19 0.09851 
12 Australia  14 3.33 3.16 0.09481 3.45 3.30 0.10176 
13 Saudi Arabia  1 3.23 3.06 0.09179 2.79 2.66 0.08206 
14 Indonesia,  Thailand 12 3.18 3.01 0.0903 2.54 2.42 0.07487 
15 Nigeria,  Uganda 20 3.18 3.01 0.09029 3.41 3.26 0.10061 
16 Egypt,  Kuwait 13 2.95 2.79 0.08375 2.72 2.59 0.08011 
17 China  1 2.94 2.79 0.08368 2.79 2.66 0.08207 
18 Switzerland  8 2.85 2.69 0.08091 2.97 2.83 0.08739 
19 Russia  1 2.75 2.60 0.07814 2.79 2.66 0.08206 
20 Brazil  9 2.46 2.33 0.0699 3.60 3.43 0.10605 
21 Iran,  Pakistan 7 2.45 2.32 0.06969 3.38 3.22 0.09956 
22 India 4 2.40 2.27 0.06814 3.40 3.24 0.10018 
23 Chile,  Argentina 6 2.00 1.89 0.05674 2.32 2.21 0.06817 
24 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau 24 1.41 1.34 0.04024 2.00 1.90 0.05861 
 Total 182 100 100 3.00404 100 100 3.08833 
*If the directors of a constituency on the two bodies are from different countries, that for the 
IMF is listed first. Power indices have been calculated using the method of generating 
functions using the program ipgenf  on the website www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae. 
 
6. Restoring the ‘Basic’ Votes to their Original Level 
One of the key proposals to improve the democratic legitimacy of the BWIs that 
has been made by the developing and poor countries, that has gained widespread 
support among industrial countries as well, has been the restoration of the basic votes 
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to their level at the time of the foundation of the institutions in 1946. (Buira, 2002, 
Woods, 2001) Then each country was allocated 250 basic votes, which did not depend 
on its quota or shareholding. However, although these basic votes have remained 
unchanged and the number of member countries has increased more than fourfold, 
IMF quotas and World Bank shareholdings have grown more than 37-fold. The result 
has been that the basic votes, which represent such a large fraction of the voting 
weight of the poor countries, have been eroded dramatically limiting the voice of 
these countries in decision making. The basic votes in the IMF have declined from 
their original level of 11.3 percent (and their maximum level of 14 percent in 1956) to 
0.5 percent now, and a similar pattern has occurred in the World Bank.  
Table 3 reports the effect on voting power of restoring the basic votes to 11.3 
percent. We have assumed the basic votes of each member country of the IMF to 
become 1480, and in the World Bank to be 1088, instead of 250. The number of 
quota- or shareholding- based votes remains the same for each country but now these 
represent in total a smaller fraction than currently, 88.7 percent. The effect is 
substantially to increase the voting weight of the poor countries and reduce the weight 
of the large industrial countries, but has little effect on the larger developing 
countries, some of whose weight shares fall. 
The power analysis shows that, while the weights and powers of the smaller 
poor countries increase at the expense of the large and rich countries, the United 
States still has more power than weight, although the effect is smaller than before. It 
is therefore still the case that the system of weighted voting favours the USA, through 
its voting power being much greater than its weight. 
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Table 3. The Effect of Increasing the Basic Votes in the Governors:  
Weights and Voting Powers (Selected Countries) 
 
 IMF World Bank 
 Unchanged Power Adjusted Power Unchanged Power Adjusted Power 
 Weights Share Weights Share Weights Share Weights Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
USA 17.11 20.43 15.56 18.59 16.40 19.49 15.02 17.86 
Japan 6.14 6.00 5.61 5.52 7.87 7.86 7.23 7.25 
Germany 6.00 5.86 5.49 5.39 4.49 4.35 4.15 4.04 
France 4.95 4.80 4.54 4.42 4.31 4.17 3.98 3.87 
UK 4.95 4.80 4.54 4.42 4.31 4.17 3.98 3.87 
Italy 3.26 3.13 3.00 2.90 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
Saudi Arabia 3.23 3.10 2.98 2.87 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
Canada 2.94 2.82 2.72 2.62 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
China 2.94 2.82 2.72 2.62 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
Russia 2.75 2.63 2.54 2.45 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
Netherlands 2.39 2.28 2.22 2.13 2.21 2.12 2.07 1.99 
Belgium 2.13 2.04 1.98 1.90 1.81 1.73 1.70 1.63 
India 1.93 1.84 1.80 1.72 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.50 
Switzerland 1.60 1.53 1.50 1.44 1.66 1.59 1.56 1.50 
Australia 1.50 1.43 1.41 1.35 1.53 1.46 1.44 1.39 
Spain 1.42 1.35 1.33 1.28 1.75 1.67 1.64 1.58 
Brazil 1.41 1.34 1.33 1.27 2.07 1.99 1.94 1.87 
Venezuela 1.24 1.18 1.17 1.12 1.27 1.22 1.21 1.16 
Mexico 1.20 1.15 1.14 1.09 1.18 1.13 1.12 1.08 
Sweden 1.11 1.06 1.06 1.02 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.87 
Argentina 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.91 1.12 1.07 1.07 1.03 
Indonesia 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.87 
Austria 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.66 
South Africa 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.79 
Nigeria 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.74 
Norway 0.78 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.60 
Denmark 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.79 
Korea 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.92 
Iran 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.66 1.48 1.42 1.40 1.34 
Malaysia 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.51 
Bangladesh 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.32 
Jamaica 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.20 
Guatemala 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.17 
Ethiopia 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11 
… … … … … … … … … 
Power indices calculations done using the program ipmmle. 
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7. The Executive Board as a Representative Democratic Body 
Executive directors have two sets of roles; on the one hand they are professional 
members of the executive, working in a more or less continual session in a collegial 
relationship with their colleagues, as experts charged with implementing policies that 
are technically objective and politically neutral, and on the other they are appointed or 
elected representatives of the members who chose them and therefore political 
representatives. We are going to be concerned in this section with the latter set of 
roles, in particular those of the elected directors. 
Although the Articles prescribe a set of formal rules for electing directors, in 
practice there is a constituency system in which the constituencies and their operation 
are said to be outside the scope of the BWIs, such that there are no formally laid down 
rules governing the relationships between directors and their electors that we can 
study. According to this those members who do not have the right to appoint their 
own director are arranged into rough geographical groupings. It is possible and 
natural to consider these constituencies as groups of electors which have a 
relationship with their elected representative director as any constituency does with its 
representative or delegate. The constituencies have no formal existence in the 
institutions and their workings are invariably referred to as being outside the 
institutions. However it seems natural to treat them for the purposes of understanding 
the power relations as electoral bodies. 
Constitutionally constituencies are defined formally, not as geographical or 
other groupings of countries, but by the fact that all members voted for the director at 
the biennial election. This does not mean that there is general unanimity among them 
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however and there is naturally considerable divergence of view, particularly in those 
constituencies containing both developing and industrial countries. Several 
commentators have pointed out that although directors are supposed to represent all 
their constituents equally, in fact they tend to give priority to the interests of their own 
country, and to regard attempts by other countries to become involved in decision 
making as “interference”. The suggestion has been made that, in the interests of 
greater transparency, the informal constituency consensus system be replaced with 
one of open voting with ordinary decisions taken by simple majority. (Wood, 2001). 
Many of the constituencies have a powerful dominant member whose director is 
invariably elected and so in effect these have become permanent board members. In 
some cases this member has an absolute majority in the constituency and therefore the 
other members would have no voting power if a vote were taken. This dominance 
means that the representatives of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland invariably chair their constituencies and are effectively 
permanent members of the board. Where the constituencies are mixed with both 
industrial and developing countries the chair is invariably the director from the 
industrial country. The other eight constituencies have no single dominant member 
and the chair rotates or changes otherwise. 
As the institutions have grown with the addition of new members over the 
years, the size of the board has also grown but less than proportionately, with the 
result that the sizes of the constituencies have increased. Now there are an average of 
eleven members in each of the constituencies that elects its director. The size of 
constituencies varies enormously: from the ‘Indian’ constituency with only four 
members to the two enormous African constituencies, ‘Anglophone Africa’ which has 
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20 members and ‘Francophone Africa’ which is the largest with 24 members. The 
large size of these latter two constituencies representing many of the poorest 
countries, many involved with IMF/World Bank programmes, which have only one 
director each, is a major factor limiting the development and implementation of 
meaningful poverty reduction strategies. There is an urgent need to increase the 
representation of the African countries which has been widely acknowledged. 
In the discussion of the BWIs it is customary to refer to the constituencies as if 
they operated just like any other in a representative democracy. Spokesmen for the 
IMF and World Bank often refer to constituencies in these terms. Directors meet their 
constituencies at the annual IMF/World Bank meetings.  
However there appears to be issue of democratic legitimacy when one reads in 
the authoritative work on the governance of the IMF: “When members belonging to a 
given constituency hold different views on a subject, the executive director can put 
differing views on record but cannot split his or her vote. The resolution of such 
conflicts is for each director to decide and any director remains free to record an 
abstention or an objection to a particular decision. The system has a tempering impact 
and evidence shows that the decisions that finally result may well be the best that 
could be taken under the circumstances.” (Van Houtven, 2002). We take the view that 
it would be appropriate, in the interests of greater transparency and democratic 
legitimacy that decisions be taken in constituencies by majority vote. This argument 
gains particular force in view of the fact that IMF and World Bank conditionalities 
imposed on poor countries include “good governance” and democratization 
requirements, and it seems not unreasonable that the same should apply to the BWIs 
themselves. 
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There is no presumption that all constituencies are alike in their composition or 
operation. We can distinguish two types of constituencies in terms of their 
composition by types of countries that make them up. Seven are mixed industrial, 
middle income and developing or transitional countries and nine are developing 
countries. Many of them, especially the mixed groups, have a member with a very 
large weight, usually an industrial country, which is dominant within the group and 
whose representative is invariably elected. Some constituencies have different 
arrangements for selecting their director and the office rotates; this may be the case 
where there is no one member who is dominant in terms of weight, such as the 
Nordic-Baltic constituency and also the two African constituencies; alternatively there 
may be two or three relatively dominant members among whom the office rotates but 
excluding the smaller members, for example the Mexican-Venezuelan-Spanish group 
where there are three dominant members.  
The Articles do contain one provision for majority voting within constituencies: 
the procedure for a by-election for an executive director.13 The members of the 
relevant constituency elect the replacement by a simple majority of the votes cast. 
There has been at least one case where a constituency has actually elected their 
director by simple majority voting rather than the consensus method14. We therefore 
feel it is of interest and appropriate to investigate the voting power of the member 
countries using voting power analysis on the stylized model of representative 
democracy suggested by the constituency system. 
                                                
13 Article XII, Section 3 (f): “…If the office of an elected Executive Director becomes 
vacant more than ninety days before the end of his term, another Executive Director 
shall be elected for the remainder of the term by the members that elected the former 
Executive Director. A majority of the votes cast shall be required for election. …” 
14 For example the Middle Eastern constituency in the IMF has selected its executive 
member by open election among candidates from different countries. 
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The first result is that because five members have weights which give them a 
majority within their constituency they are formally dictators and all the other 
members are powerless. This applies to Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Brazil and India. 
In effect this means just an increase in the voting weight for each one and a 
consequent big enhancement of its power: thus, Italy’s IMF voting weight becomes 
4.19 percent, instead of 3.26, Canada’s becomes 3.71 instead of 2.94, and so on. The 
country that benefits most from this effect is Switzerland whose voting weight goes 
up by 1.25 percent of the votes, to 2.85 percent.  
The details are in Table 4 which also shows those countries whose weight does 
not make them ‘dictators’ but which are dominant in their constituencies: Belgium, 
Netherlands, Australia and Argentina. The table shows the relevant power shares as 
well as the voting weights of the countries and constituencies. The increases in weight 
are much larger for this group: Belgium’s weight increases by over 3 percent, the 
Netherlands by well over 2. percent and Australia and Argentina gain almost 2 
percent. The power shares of these countries in their constituencies are less than 1but 
they are dominant and would tend to win an election. For example Netherlands has a 
power share of over 98 percent, Belgium over 68 percent, Argentina 75 percent and 
Australia 49 percent. Thus the weight and power of these countries in the executive is 
enhanced by the constituency system. 
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Table 4.  Countries Dominant in their Constituency 
 IMF World Bank 
 Weight  
% 
Constituency 
Weight % 
Power 
Share% 
Weight 
% 
Constituency 
Weight % 
Power 
Share % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Countries with an absolute majority in their constituency: ‘Dictators’ 
Italy 3.26 4.19 100 2.79 3.51 100 
Canada 2.94 3.71 100 2.79 3.85 100 
Switzerland 1.60 2.85 100 1.66 2.97 100 
Brazil 1.41 2.46 100 2.07 3.60 100 
India 1.93 2.40 100 2.79 3.40 100 
Countries dominant within their constituency but without an absolute majority 
Belgium 2.13 5.14 68.89 1.81 4.80* 59.79 
Netherlands 2.39 4.85 98.94 2.21 4.47 98.94 
Australia 1.50 3.33 49.97 1.53 3.45 48.63 
Argentina 0.99 2.00 75.00 1.12 2.32 75.00 
Columns (1) and (4) are the countries’ weight shares in the institution; columns (2) and 
(5) the constituency shares; (3) and (6) are the power shares within the constituency. 
*Votes cast by Austria. 
 
The second set of results is the list of those countries that are powerless. These 
include, not only all the remaining members of the five constituencies which have a 
dictator, but also the results of the voting power analysis reveal another six countries 
which have zero voting power although their constituencies do not have a dictator 
(analogous to the Luxembourg EEC example described in section 2 above). These are 
Estonia in the IMF, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
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The case of Estonia is shown in the analysis of the Nordic-Baltic constituency 
in Table 5. This is illustrative of the value of the voting power approach because it has 
the interesting property that although it has no member so powerful as to be a dictator, 
there is one member, which has some votes but which is still powerless in the IMF. 
The voting weights of the eight members are such that Estonia, with its 902 votes, 
could never cast the decisive vote, and therefore its voting power is zero. On the other 
hand it should be noted that this is just a property of the voting weights used by the 
IMF, and does not apply in the World Bank where the weights are different. In that 
body Estonia could be decisive in 2 out of 128 voting outcomes and therefore has 
some power. 
Table 5. Voting Power Analysis of the Nordic-Baltic Constituency 
IMF 
Country Votes 
Weight % Weight 
Share Decisive 
Power  
Index 
Power  
Share 
Denmark 16,678 0.77 21.93 36 0.28125 17.64 
Estonia 902 0.04 1.14 0 0 0 
Finland 12,888 0.59 16.81 28 0.21875 13.72 
Iceland 1,426 0.07 1.87 4 0.03125 01.96 
Latvia 1,518 0.07 1.99 4 0.03125 01.96 
Lithuania 1,692 0.08 2.22 4 0.03125 01.96 
Norway 16,967 0.78 22.24 36 0.28125 17.64 
Sweden 24,205 1.11 31.73 92 0.71875 45.09 
Sum 76,276 3.51 100   100 
World Bank 
Country Votes 
Weight % Weight 
Share Decisive 
Power  
Index 
Power  
Share 
Denmark 13,701 0.85 25.35 54 0.42188 23.28 
Estonia 1,173 0.07 2.17 2 0.01562 0.86 
Finland 8,810 0.54 16.30 22 0.17188 9.48 
Iceland 1,508 0.09 2.79 10 0.07812 4.31 
Latvia 1,634 0.1 3.02 14 0.10938 6.03 
Lithuania 1,757 0.11 3.25 14 0.10938 6.03 
Norway 10,232 0.63 18.93 42 0.32812 18.10 
Sweden 15,224 0.94 28.17 74 0.57812 31.90 
Sum 54,039 3.33 100   100 
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A second example of a constituency that does not have a dictator but does have 
a number of powerless members is the one that contains Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, 
and most of Central America. There are three large members which share the power 
equally among them and all the five small members have no power at all. The 
analysis is presented in Table 6. Each of the three big countries has a power index of 
one half, and their power shares are all one third. The results are the same for the 
World Bank, although the voting weights are slightly different. 
 
Table 6.  Voting Power Analysis of the Spanish-Central American 
Constituency (IMF) 
Country Votes 
Weight  
Share Decisive 
Power 
Index 
Power 
Share 
Costa Rica 1891 2.03 0 0 0 
ElSalvador 1963 2.11 0 0 0 
Guatemala 2352 2.52 0 0 0 
Honduras 1545 1.66 0 0 0 
Mexico 26108 28.08 64 0.5 33.33 
Nicaragua 1550 1.67 0 0 0 
Spain 30739 33.06 64 0.5 33.33 
Venezuela 26841 28.86 64 0.5 33.33 
Sum  100   100 
 
Therefore there are in total 41 member countries (22 percent of the 
membership), in possession of some 4.3 percent of the votes of the IMF (5.5 percent 
of the World Bank) that would be powerless. They include some industrial countries 
but in the main they are developing countries. They are listed in Table 7. 
Now we can analyse voting power of every member by considering an indirect 
voting system. Each member’s power is the product of voting power in two voting 
bodies: first, in the constituency, then through the power of the constituency in the 
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Executive. The member’s voting power index is the arithmetic product of these two 
power indices. It is of interest to use this technique to investigate which members gain 
and which lose power from the constituency system. Obviously the 41 members who 
have been shown to be powerless lose from such a two-stage system. However it is 
not clear that the countries that dominate their constituencies, including the dictators 
listed in Table 4, necessarily gain since it depends on the power of their constituency. 
Table 8 gives some results of this analysis for both institutions. Only the results for 
the countries that gain or lose most are presented. The power indices for the 
Governors, from Table 1, have been repeated, and these are used as the basis of 
comparison with the indices for the two-stage voting structure we have assumed. 
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Table 7. The Countries with No Voting Power 
Country 
Weight 
IMF  % 
Weight 
WB % Country 
Weight 
IMF  % 
Weight 
WB % 
Poland 0.64 0.69 Suriname 0.05 0.04 
Philippines  0.44 Guyana 0.05 0.08 
Portugal 0.41 0.35 Kyrgyz 0.05 0.08 
Ireland 0.40 0.34 Tajikistan 0.05 0.08 
Greece 0.39 0.12 Turkmenistan 0.05 0.05 
Colombia 0.37 0.41 Barbados 0.04 0.07 
Bangladesh 0.26 0.32 Estonia 0.04  
Serbia 0.23 0.11 Haiti 0.04 0.08 
SriLanka 0.20 0.25 Albania 0.03 0.07 
TrinidadTobago 0.17 0.18 Belize 0.02 0.05 
Ecuador 0.15 0.19 San Marino 0.02 0.05 
Uzbekistan 0.14 0.17 StLucia 0.02 0.05 
Jamaica 0.14 0.17 Antigua 0.02 0.05 
DominicanRepublic 0.11 0.14 Grenada 0.02 0.05 
Guatemala 0.11 0.14 StKitts 0.02 0.03 
Panama 0.11 0.04 StVincent 0.02 0.03 
ElSalvador 0.09 0.02 Dominica 0.02 0.05 
Costa Rica 0.09 0.03 East Timor 0.02 0.05 
Azerbaijan 0.09 0.12 Bhutan 0.01 0.05 
Bahamas 0.07 0.08    
Nicaragua 0.07 0.05 Total Votes 4.35 5.51 
Honduras 0.07 0.06 Percentage of Member  
Malta 0.06 0.08 Countries 22.28% 22.28% 
 
 
Table 8 gives the results for the top ten gainers and the top ten losers, 
comparing the country’s power in this two-stage voting procedure with its power in 
the governors15. The results show that the countries which gain most (in some cases 
very substantially) tend to be dominant in their constituencies: Belgium, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Australia and Brazil. It is not a universal effect, however, and notably 
neither Canada, Italy nor India are on this list. However it does tend to indicate 
                                                
15 The ordering is in terms of the changes in the IMF powers. 
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another hidden source of bias towards the medium sized European countries. The 
biggest losers are all the members who are appointed. 
 
Table 8. Voting Power Indices for the Executive Board as a Democratic 
Representative Body: Biggest Gainers and Losers 
 IMF World Bank 
 Governors 
Two Stage 
Voting Difference Governors 
Two Stage 
Voting Difference 
Biggest Gainers:       
Belgium 0.0761 0.1356 0.0595 0.0663 0.1253 0.0590 
Netherlands 0.0853 0.1381 0.0528 0.0812 0.1318 0.0505 
Sweden 0.0397 0.0718 0.0321 0.0345 0.0570 0.0225 
Indonesia 0.0345 0.0600 0.0255 0.0345 0.0563 0.0218 
Switzerland 0.0572 0.0809 0.0237 0.0609 0.0874 0.0265 
Kuwait 0.0231 0.0445 0.0214 0.0307 0.0547 0.0240 
Australia 0.0535 0.0749 0.0214 0.0561 0.0846 0.0285 
Brazil 0.0502 0.0699 0.0197 0.0762 0.1061 0.0299 
South Africa 0.0310 0.0494 0.0184 0.0311 0.0545 0.0234 
Mexico 0.0428 0.0609 0.0181 0.0432 0.0665 0.0233 
Biggest Losers:       
Austria 0.0311 0.0109 -0.0202 0.0256 0.0166 -0.0090 
China  0.1054 0.0837 -0.0217 0.1026 0.0821 -0.0205 
Ukraine 0.0229 0.0001 -0.0228 0.0253 0.0001 -0.0251 
Poland 0.0229 0.0000 -0.0229 0.0253 0.0000 -0.0253 
Saudi Arabia  0.1157 0.0918 -0.0239 0.1026 0.0821 -0.0205 
France  0.1794 0.1412 -0.0382 0.1598 0.1272 -0.0326 
UK  0.1794 0.1412 -0.0382 0.1598 0.1272 -0.0326 
Germany 0.2189 0.1711 -0.0478 0.1669 0.1320 -0.0349 
Japan 0.2243 0.1751 -0.0492 0.3014 0.2332 -0.0682 
USA  0.7631 0.6459 -0.1172 0.7471 0.6231 -0.1240 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the voting system of the IMF and World Bank using 
the method of voting power analysis and using power indices. It argues, and hopefully 
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has demonstrated, that this approach provides valuable insights into understanding 
weighted voting systems such as this. The method has been applied in two ways: first 
in a straightforward analysis of power relations in the existing decision-making 
system, taking into account given structures in terms of voting weights; and secondly, 
more speculatively, to analyse scenarios of interest: the effect of increasing the basic 
votes as proposed as a means of increasing the voice of the poor, and secondly to 
investigate the implications of making the Executive Board into a representative body 
on transparent, democratic principles based on majority voting within constituencies. 
The principal finding – from the first analysis - is that the power share of the United 
States is always substantially much more than its share of voting weight, while for all 
other members, their power shares are slightly lower than their weight. Weighted 
voting is therefore a source of additional bias in favour of the USA in the Bretton 
Woods institutions. This bias would remain even after a redistribution of votes to 
restore the basic votes to their original level. 
That there is such a pronounced difference between voting weight and voting 
power and for the USA, as we have found, gives added support to arguments for 
breaking the link between the quotas or shareholdings and votes. If one wishes to 
argue that voting power should be based on the payment of financial contributions, 
then these ought to be related to voting power rather than only the weighted vote. 
The second use of voting power analysis in this study has been to investigate 
the implications for voting power of the use of an indirect two-stage voting system 
that we have assumed to exist with the current voting weights. The results suggest that 
such a system would tend strongly to benefit the smaller European countries, 
especially Belgium and the Netherlands, but also other industrial countries as well. 
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